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INTRODUCTION
I have been driven to the conclusion that the Supreme Court, as a
matter of conscience, considers racial discrimination to be good for
America. That conclusion offers the only plausible account of the
Court's repeated insistence on displacing populist efforts to promote
racial equality with the Court's own, more-regressive, version of expedi-
ent racial politics. Although the Court has had what is at best a check-
ered history when called upon to adjudicate claims of racial injustice,
until now, the contemporary Court might arguably have been accorded
the benefit of the doubt. But after its five-to-four ruling in the 2007
Resegregation case,' the need to acknowledge the influence of inten-
tional discrimination on the Court's racial decisions seems inescapable.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1,2 gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to make a strong state-
ment about race. Seizing upon that opportunity, a five-Justice conserva-
tive majority held that the Constitution not only permitted the passive
resegregation of Louisville and Seattle public schools, but effectively
required it. Moreover, the Court depicted the landmark school desegre-
gation case of Brown v. Board of Education3 as compelling, rather than
precluding, such a counterintuitive result. The Court's Resegregation
ruling is doctrinally so bizarre that it is difficult to view the decision as
having emanated from any genuine constitutional principle. Rather, it
appears to be simply the product of conservative racial politics being
practiced by a conservative Supreme Court voting bloc. My hope is that
the Resegregation decision will make the racial politics of the Court so
palpable that it can no longer be ignored. This, in turn, may cost the
Court the legitimacy that it needs to command continued public support
for its partisan racial policies.
Brown notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has historically served
as more of an impediment than an aid to the achievement of racial equal-
ity in the United States. But it has never been clear to me why the Court
would be racially more iniquitous than the population at large. However,
Princeton economics professor Paul Krugman has had an insight that
may help provide an answer. In his recent book The Conscience of a
1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007)
(invalidating race-conscious efforts to prevent resegregation of public schools in consolidated
cases involving the Seattle, Washington and Louisville/Jefferson County, Kentucky school
systems).
2. Id.
3. 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (rejecting separate-but-equal doctrine and declaring official
school segregation to be unconstitutional); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S.
294, 301 (1955) (tempering effect of Brown by declining to order immediate school desegregation
and instead requiring desegregation "with all deliberate speed").
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Liberal,4 Krugman argues that a small, wealthy elite in the United States
devised a political strategy, known as "movement conservatism," that
has now come to dominate the Republican party. The goal of the strat-
egy is to undo the trend toward economic equality that was begun by the
New Deal welfare state, and to increase dramatically the divergence of
wealth that exists between the middle class and the rich. Because such a
divergence works to the disadvantage of average citizens and voters,
movement conservatives had to find some way of creating a sympathetic
political coalition that would include the middle class. (Apparently, the
poor are neither politically active enough nor ideologically sympathetic
enough to target for inclusion in this coalition.') Movement conserva-
tives appealed to middle-class voters by exploiting the issue of race.
Because race is something that many voters care about even more than
their own economic interests, tacit appeals to racial prejudice can often
serve as a useful political organizing tool. By associating progressive
economic policies with xenophobic racial fears in the minds of white
middle-class voters, an ideologically strident, movement-conservative
plutocracy has been able to convince ordinary citizens to resist redistrib-
utive efforts that would have benefited whites and racial minorities
alike. Moreover, the Supreme Court has been particularly well-posi-
tioned to help in this endeavor.
I think the present conservative majority on the Supreme Court can
best be viewed as the judicial branch of the movement-conservative
political campaign to dismantle the New Deal welfare state. When in
power, movement-conservative Supreme Court Justices are able to
invalidate on constitutional grounds progressive legislation that seeks to
promote income redistribution.6 But a movement-conservative Supreme
Court majority can also do much more. Although white middle-class
voters may have racial attitudes that cause them to be apprehensive
about benefiting or even interacting with racial minorities, most contem-
porary voters do not think of themselves as overtly racist. A conserva-
tive Supreme Court majority can, therefore, provide aid and comfort to
those voters through the use of constitutional exposition. By re-charac-
terizing policies that disadvantage racial minorities as policies that are
consistent with the constitutional concept of equality, the conservative
4. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (2007).
5. See id. at 192-94.
6. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905) (invalidating as
constitutional-due-process violation New York maximum-hours health-and-safety legislation for
bakers); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244-51 (1978) (invalidating as
violation of Contract Clause state statute imposing pension funding requirements for employees
without contractually vested pension rights); cf Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
838-42 (1987) (invalidating as uncompensated regulatory taking imposition of public easement
across private beachfront property as condition on issuance of building permit).
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Supreme Court majority is able to convince white citizens that they are
behaving honorably rather than discriminatorily when they succumb to
their baser, racially parochial instincts. That is precisely what happened
in the Resegregation case. And that strategy, in turn, has enhanced the
ability of movement conservatism to use coded appeals to racial
prejudice as the glue that holds its pluralist political coalition together.
Ironically, movement-conservative leaders discriminate against racial
minorities not so much out of racial hostility as out of the recognition
that exploiting minorities provides a politically expedient way to exploit
middle-class whites.
Part I of this Article discusses the Resegregation case and describes
how difficult it is to view that case as anything other than a deliberately
disingenuous distortion of Brown. Part II describes Krugman's account
of the ways in which movement conservatism has enlisted tacit appeals
to white racial prejudice as a strategy for prompting white middle-class
citizens to vote in ways that are consistent with the interests of the rich
rather than the interests of the middle class. Part III describes my view
of the interaction between movement conservatism and Supreme Court
constitutional hegemony, arguing that this interaction creates a judicial
plutocracy that can use race to advance the political agenda of the
wealthy. The article concludes by expressing the hope that the Supreme
Court so overplayed its hand in the Resegregation case that the Court
will no longer be able to pass off its conservative racial agenda as the
product of detached constitutional exposition. However, I offer this con-
clusion with a healthy dose of pessimism, rather than the sense of prag-
matic anticipation that I wish I could muster.
I. THE RESEGREGATION CASE
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1 squarely presented the Supreme Court with the issue of whether
local school boards-motivated by the desire to preserve the racial inte-
gration that they had achieved after lengthy efforts to comply with the
desegregation mandate of Brown-could voluntarily consider race in
assigning particular students to particular schools.7 The Louisville and
Seattle school systems involved in the case both had long histories of
alleged de jure discrimination, and both had been required to use race-
conscious student assignments in order to comply with Brown. Louis-
ville had been required to do so by a federal-court desegregation order,
and Seattle had been required to do so as part of a settlement agreement
that resolved a federal desegregation suit.8
7. See 127 S. Ct. at 2746.
8. See id. at 2809-I1 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 63:431
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The two school systems eventually achieved sufficient post-Brown
integration to be characterized as unitary and were therefore beyond the
scope of federal court desegregation jurisdiction. However, both school
systems chose voluntarily to continue some of their race-conscious stu-
dent assignments in order to combat the post-Brown school resegrega-
tion that was occurring as a result of residential population shifts.9
Under the voluntary-integration plans that the school boards adopted,
race could be considered only in isolated cases to deny a student's pre-
ferred school assignment, and then only when that assignment would
exacerbate the school's racial imbalance badly enough to move the
school outside of its specified integration range.'° The school boards did
not rely on race lightly. They did so only after they became convinced
that race-neutral efforts to maintain integration were proving ineffec-
tive." Moreover, both the Louisville and Seattle plans were narrow
enough that they ended up permitting the consideration of race in only a
small number of cases. 2
Despite the narrowness of the voluntary-integration plans, a disap-
pointed white parent in Louisville, and an organization representing dis-
appointed parents in Seattle, challenged the constitutionality of the plans
on Equal Protection grounds. The lower courts upheld the plans, con-
cluding that the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger
13
had established that the narrowly tailored consideration of race as a
means for advancing a state's compelling interest in educational diver-
sity was constitutionally permissible.14 In 2006, the Supreme Court itself
had even denied certiorari in another post-Grutter case, where the lower
courts had upheld the consideration of race as a means of resisting
resegregation. 15 But a few months later, there were two changes in
Supreme Court personnel. Chief Justice Roberts replaced Chief Justice
9. See id. at 2746-47, 2749-50 (majority opinion).
10. See id. at 2809-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
11. See id. at 2824-30.
12. See id.; cf id. at 2759-61 (majority opinion) (arguing that small number of affected
students suggested that race-neutral alternatives might suffice); id. at 2792-93 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (same).
13. 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (upholding Michigan Law School's affirmative-action plan as a
narrowly tailored means of advancing compelling interest in student diversity). But see Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (invalidating affirmative-action plan for undergraduate
student admissions at the University of Michigan as not narrowly tailored).
14. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746, 2749-50; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (relying on Grutter to
uphold school district's plan), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738; McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch.,
330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (relying on Grutter to uphold school district's plan),
affd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738.
15. See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (upholding
Massachusetts school-integration plan), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1061 (2005).
20091
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Rehnquist, and Justice Alito replaced Justice O'Connor. Those changes
gave the Court a more conservative five-Justice majority on racial issues
than it previously had, and the new Roberts Court then granted certiorari
in the Louisville and Seattle cases. 1 6 A consolidated five-to-four
Supreme Court decision resolving both cases ultimately reversed the
lower courts, and held that the two integration plans were unconstitu-
tional because their consideration of race to prevent resegregation vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.17
Doctrinally, what the Supreme Court did in the Resegregation case
is difficult to comprehend. It requires a very tortured reading of Brown
and its progeny to reach the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution requires public schools to be resegregated rather than
integrated. As I have argued more extensively elsewhere,' 8 however, the
Resegregation case was not a doctrinal decision. It was a political one.
And viewed politically, the case becomes easier to understand. The new
five-justice conservative majority on the Roberts Supreme Court simply
used the Resegregation case to nullify a progressive equality gain that
racial minorities were able to secure through the political process. In so
doing, the majority once again replicated the racially oppressive prac-
tices that were engaged in repeatedly by prior Supreme Court majorities
throughout the nation's history-a history marked by cases such as Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 9 Plessy v. Ferguson,2 ° and Korematsu v. United
States,2" which have become so infamous that they are now widely dis-
credited. In the Resegregation case, however, the Roberts Court's
manipulation of constitutional doctrine for political purposes was so
transparent that it may end up causing the Court to lose legitimacy even
in its own time.
A. Political Opinions
The majority opinion invalidating the integration plans at issue in
16. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race in Integration Plans, N.Y.
Tivms, June 29, 2007, at Al (discussing political change in Court membership); see also Joan
Biskupic, Few Big Rulings as Justices Felt Out New Roles, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, at 9A
(discussing political leanings of new Supreme Court Justices).
17. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746; id. at 2767-68 (plurality opinion).
18. See Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. LouisVILLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
19. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 452 (1857) (holding that blacks could not be citizens within
the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction and
invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery as interfering with property
rights of slave owners).
20. 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of separate-but-equal
regime of racial discrimination in public facilities, by finding that segregation did not constitute
unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause).
21. 323 U.S. 214, 215-19 (1944) (upholding World War II exclusion order that led to
Japanese American internment).
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the Resegregation case was written by Chief Justice Roberts, and Rob-
erts was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Relying
heavily on Brown, Chief Justice Roberts argued that strict Equal Protec-
tion scrutiny precluded the consideration of race in the Louisville and
Seattle student-assignment plans.22 A plurality portion of the Roberts
opinion, arguably suggesting that race could never be used to achieve de
facto integration, was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, but
not by Justice Kennedy.23 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion,
asserting that the Constitution required colorblindness even in the face
of resegregation.24 Justice Kennedy-who now appears to be the swing
vote on this issue-wrote a separate concurring opinion, explaining that
he parted company with the Roberts plurality because he thought that
facially neutral, race-conscious remedies for de facto segregation might
be a constitutionally permissible means of promoting integration if race-
neutral means were first shown to be inadequate.25 Justice Stevens wrote
a brief dissenting opinion, chastising the majority for suggesting that its
result followed from Brown.26 Justice Breyer wrote a long dissent,
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, arguing that the Rob-
erts majority and plurality opinions misapplied Brown in a way that
would frustrate the possibility of achieving racially integrated education
in the future.2 All of the opinions written in the Resegregation case
seem to have been motivated by the political views of the Justices who
joined them.
1. THE CONSERVATIVE BLOC
The five Justices who found the Louisville and Seattle integration
plans to be unconstitutional comprise a conservative Supreme Court vot-
ing bloc on the issue of race.28 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
were recently appointed to the Supreme Court by President George W.
Bush, largely because of their conservative political views.29 Prior to the
Resegregation decision, they participated in only one other Supreme
Court race case-a statutory, Texas redistricting case under the Voting
Rights Act, in which both Justices voted to reject the black and Latino
22. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746, 2751-54, 2759-61.
23. See id. at 2755-59, 2761-68 (plurality opinion); id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
24. See id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring).
25. See id. at 2791-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
26. See id. at 2797-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. See id. at 2800-01 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
28. This argument is developed more fully in Spann, supra note 18. That article also
discusses the facts and various opinions in the Resegregation case in greater detail. See id.
29. See Biskupic, supra note 16 (discussing political leanings of new Supreme Court
Justices).
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racial-minority-voting interests that were at issue. 30 Justices Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas have longer Supreme Court histories of opposition to
racial-minority interests. All three have consistently voted against the
racial-minority interest presented in every constitutional affirmative-
action, majority-minority redistricting, and integration case they have
considered while on the Supreme Court.' Accordingly, no Justice in the
Resegregation case majority has ever voted in favor of a racial-minority
interest in any such affirmative-action case.32
The majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in the Resegregation
case-which was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito-forcefully reiterates the now-established view that all racial clas-
sifications are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause, regardless of whether they are benign or invidious in nature. 33
The Louisville and Seattle integration plans failed to survive strict scru-
tiny, because Justice Roberts concluded that they neither advanced a
compelling governmental interest, nor were narrowly tailored efforts to
do so. Because the racial imbalances that the integration plans sought to
correct were de facto rather than de jure in nature, the school boards
lacked any compelling interest in eliminating the resegregation that was
producing those racial imbalances.34 Moreover, the state interest in edu-
cational diversity that the Grutter Court had found to be compelling four
30. After Grutter was decided, the Supreme Court invalidated, five to four, under the Voting
Rights Act, a mid-decade Texas redistricting plan that eliminated a majority-Latino voting district.
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423-42 (2006) (upholding
Latino vote-dilution claim). Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, voted to reject this
claim. See id. at 492-511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part, joined by Alito, J.). Justices Scalia and Thomas also voted to reject this
claim. See id. at 511-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Thomas, J.). In addition, a majority of the Court rejected a Voting Rights Act claim
asserting dilution of black voting strength. See id. at 443-47 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.,
joined by Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J.); id. at 492-93 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, joined by Alito, J.); id. at 511-12 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Thomas, J.).
31. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 159-63 (2000) (discussing
Supreme Court voting blocs and voting records on affirmative action and redistricting). Since the
statistics in that book were published, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas have also voted
against racial-minority interests in the Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003), and Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 247 (2003), affirmative-action cases, as well as in the League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. at 405, voter-redistricting case. See supra note 30. And
they, of course, voted against the racial-minority interest in the Resegregation case, 127 S. Ct. at
2746. For reasons of convenience, I will refer to affirmative-action cases, majority-minority-
redistricting cases, and integration cases such as Parents Involved collectively as "affirmative
action" cases.
32. See supra note 31.
33. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751-52 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 224, 227 (1995)).
34. See id.
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years earlier, applied only to individualized and holistic efforts to
achieve diversity in higher education. It did not apply to the single-factor
racial diversity in primary and secondary education that the Louisville
and Seattle integration plans sought to achieve.35 Although the Louis-
ville and Seattle school boards had tried to make their integration plans
no broader than necessary to curtail resegregation, Chief Justice Roberts
found that the plans were still not narrowly tailored enough to survive
strict scrutiny. The binary focus of the plans on only "black" and
"white" racial imbalance, plus the very fact that the plans affected only a
small number of students, ironically made the plans unconstitutionally
overbroad.36
The plurality portion of the Roberts opinion-which was joined by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito-concluded that the Louisville and
Seattle integration plans were concerned primarily with promoting racial
balance. Chief Justice Roberts reiterated the established view that the
goal of "outright racial balancing" was "patently unconstitutional,"
because it treated people not as individuals, but as mere members of a
racial group.37 Roberts also asserted that the plans sought to remedy
general "societal discrimination," which is a constitutionally impermis-
sible objective.38 Chief Justice Roberts finally asserted that Brown com-
pelled the invalidation of the Louisville and Seattle integration plans
because Brown prohibited the assignment of students to schools based
on their race-an "odious" 39 governmental action conveying "notions of
racial inferiority" that can lead to "a politics of racial hostility."4 ° The
post-Brown desegregation cases that did authorize the use of race-con-
scious desegregation remedies-such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Board of Education4 -were not controlling. They concerned
remedies for de jure segregation rather than the de facto segregation that
was at issue in the Resegregation case.4 2 Chief Justice Roberts ended his
opinion by proclaiming that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. 4 3
35. See id. at 2753-54.
36. See id. at 2753-54, 2759-61.
37. Id. at 2757 (plurality opinion) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)).
38. Id. at 2758.
39. Id. at 2767 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214 (1995)).
40. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
41. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
42. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2761-64 (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 2768. Chief Justice Roberts was not the first person to make such an assertion. In
his Ninth Circuit dissent in the Resegregation case, Judge Bea had stated that "[t]he way to end
racial discrimination is to stop discriminating by race." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1,426 F.3d 1162, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J., dissenting), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738.
Judge Bea also quoted Professor Van Alstyne's assertion that "one gets beyond racism by getting
beyond it now." Id. at 1221 (quoting Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 604 P.2d 1365, 1391 (Cal.
2009]
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Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion that was aimed prima-
rily at rebutting the arguments made in Justice Breyer's dissent. 44 Justice
Thomas rejected the claim that "resegregation" was occurring in Louis-
ville and Seattle, because the de facto racial imbalance caused by shift-
ing residential patterns entailed only general "societal discrimination,"
rather than the de jure discrimination for which the Constitution permit-
ted race-conscious remedies. 45 As a result, Justice Thomas agreed with
Chief Justice Roberts that post-Brown precedents such as Swann, which
permitted race-conscious desegregation remedies, were not control-
ling. 46 He also agreed that Grutter's recognition of educational diversity
as a compelling state interest was limited to the context of higher educa-
tion. Justice Thomas strongly endorsed the concept of "colorblind-
ness" espoused by Justice Harlan in his Plessy dissent,48 and asserted
that Justice Breyer's dissent in the Resegregation case was arguing for
the same deference to local racial preferences that the segregationists
had argued for in Brown.4 9
Justice Kennedy sought to adopt a compromise position between
the views expressed in the Roberts plurality opinion and the Breyer dis-
sent. He agreed with Chief Justice Roberts that the Louisville and Seattle
integration plans were unconstitutional because they were not narrowly
tailored, but he also agreed with Justice Breyer that the state interest in
educational diversity was compelling at the primary and secondary
school levels.5 The Louisville and Seattle plans could not survive the
narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny because they were confusing
and self-contradictory; they focused only on "white" and "nonwhite"
student diversity; and the number of students affected was too small to
negate the possibility that race-neutral alternatives might suffice.5 How-
ever, Justice Kennedy did believe that the nation's post-Brown history
revealed that race still mattered in contemporary culture, and that race-
conscious means of promoting educational diversity might therefore be
constitutionally permissible if they did not define students by their race.
Accordingly, facially neutral but race-conscious diversity strategies-
1980) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme
Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809-10 (1979))).
44. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring).
45. See id. at 2768-73.
46. See id. at 2771 nn.5-6.
47. See id. at 2775-79; 2781-82.
48. See id. at 2782 ("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
49. See id. at 2783-86 (citing claims that racial segregation under Plessy was racially
beneficial, and that the Supreme Court should not undo the progress that had already been made).
50. See id. at 2788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
51. See id. at 2788-93.
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such as school-site selection, gerrymandered attendance zones, or mag-
net schools-might not be subject to strict scrutiny. Rather, they might
be constitutionally permissible in the way that racial considerations are
sometimes permissible in drawing facially neutral election district
lines.5 2 Nevertheless, Grutter did not authorize the Louisville and Seat-
tle integration plans, because Grutter employed an individualized and
holistic consideration of race along with other non-racial diversity fac-
tors. The dispositive way that race was used in the Louisville and Seattle
plans was more analogous to the mechanical use of race that the Court
had invalidated in the Grutter companion case of Gratz v. Bollinger.53
Justice Kennedy also agreed with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas that post-Brown decisions such as Swann, which authorized the
use of racial remedies, were limited to cases of de jure rather than de
facto discrimination.5"
2. THE LIBERAL BLOC
The four dissenting Justices who voted to uphold the Louisville and
Seattle integration plans comprise a liberal Supreme Court voting bloc
on the issue of race. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer have
almost always voted to uphold the racial-minority interests at issue in
the constitutional affirmative-action cases that they have considered
while on the Supreme Court.55 There are two interesting deviations from
this pattern. The first consists of three early votes by Justice Stevens to
invalidate the affirmative-action plans at issue in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke,56 Fullilove v. Klutznick,57 and City of Rich-
52. See id. at 2791-92. Although Justice Kennedy does not cite his work, Professor Goodwin
Liu has argued that the Louisville and Seattle integration plans should be controlled by the
Supreme Court's redistricting cases, rather than by the Court's affirmative-action decisions. See
Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 301-09 (2007).
53. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2794 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)).
54. See id. at 2794-96.
55. SPANN, supra note 31, at 159-63 (discussing voting patterns of Justices in affirmative-
action cases); see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (voting for the
racial-minority interest); id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ.) (same); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003) (noting that Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's majority opinion upholding the
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative-action plan at issue); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 282
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting from majority decision invalidating University of Michigan's
undergraduate affirmative-action plan at issue); id. at 291 (Souter, J., dissenting) (dissenting from
same majority opinion); id. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (dissenting from same majority
opinion).
56. 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
57. 448 U.S. 448, 532 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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mond v. J.A. Croson Co.58 Since 1990, however, Justice Stevens has
consistently voted to uphold the racial-minority interest at issue in the
constitutional affirmative-action cases that he has considered while on
the Supreme Court.59 The second deviation consists of the one vote by
Justice Breyer to invalidate the affirmative-action plan at issue in Gratz
v. Bollinger.61 Justice Breyer has voted to uphold the racial-minority
interest at issue in every other constitutional affirmative-action case that
he has considered while on the Supreme Court.6'
Justice Stevens wrote a brief dissenting opinion pointing out what
he viewed as the "cruel irony" in the Chief Justice's reliance on Brown
to invalidate a school-integration plan.6' Brown was about the exclusion
of black children from white segregated schools. Not only was no such
exclusion involved in the Resegregation case, but there were not even
any reports of white children complaining about their exclusion from
black segregated schools. That important contextual factor was lost in
the Chief Justice's attempt to equate racial discrimination against blacks
with race-conscious efforts to secure the very integration that Brown
sought to achieve. 63 Chief Justice Roberts also disregarded post-Brown
precedents such as Swann, which authorized the use of race-conscious
efforts to secure integration.' 4 Justice Stevens then lamented that no Jus-
tice on the Supreme Court to which he had been appointed in 1975
would have agreed with the majority's Resegregation decision.65
Justice Breyer wrote the primary Resegregation case dissent-
which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.66 He
argued that the Louisville and Seattle integration plans satisfied strict
scrutiny as narrowly tailored efforts to advance the compelling state
interest in educational diversity, because they were similar to numerous
58. 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
59. SPANN, supra note 31, at 159-63 (discussing voting patterns of Justices in affirmative-
action cases); see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (voting for
racial-minority interest); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310 (noting that Justice Stevens joined Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion upholding the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative-
action plan at issue); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting from majority
decision invalidating University of Michigan's undergraduate affirmative-action plan at issue).
60. 539 U.S. at 281 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (invalidating University of
Michigan's undergraduate affirmative-action plan at issue).
61. SPANN, supra note 31, at 159-63 (discussing voting patterns of Justices in affirmative-
action cases); see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (voting for
racial-minority interest); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310 (noting that Justice Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion upholding the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative-
action plan at issue).
62. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 2797-2800.
64. See id. at 2799-2800.
65. See id. at 2800.
66. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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other race-conscious remedial plans that had been required, permitted,
and encouraged in the fifty years that had elapsed since Brown. The
Roberts plurality, however, undermined the ability of local school
boards to solve the problem of racial resegregation by simply ignoring
dozens of those post-Brown precedents-including the unanimous
Supreme Court decision in Swann that authorized remedial efforts to
achieve racial balance. 67 Moreover, the distinction between de facto and
de jure segregation, on which Roberts relied so heavily, was too tenuous
to support the claim that Swann-type remedies were unavailable for de
facto segregation. This was evidenced by the fact that both the Louis-
ville and Seattle cases had been initiated by claims of de jure segrega-
tion. Neither the fact that one case was settled while the other was
adjudicated, nor the fact that the two school districts had obtained a
degree of integration before becoming resegregated, was sufficient to
make race-conscious remedies unavailable.68 The de facto/de jure dis-
tinction was relevant only to what the Constitution required-not to
what it permitted.69
Justice Breyer also objected to a reading of the Equal Protection
Clause that refused to distinguish between benign and invidious race
consciousness, arguing that there were important differences between
actions that include and actions that exclude racial minorities. Moreover,
those differences were made doctrinally relevant by Grutter's insistence
on considering context when analyzing the permissibility of race-con-
scious remedies. 7° Because the Louisville and Seattle plans did not seek
to separate students on the basis of merit, it was difficult to see how any
student was stigmatized or otherwise harmed by the integration plans at
issue. Although the majority asserted that Grutter diversity was compel-
ling only in the context of higher education, the benefit of educational
diversity was even more compelling in the formative years of primary
and secondary education. Brown itself was about primary and secondary
education. This made the governmental interest in educational diversity
more than a mere interest in redressing "societal discrimination. 71
Moreover, the fact that the Louisville and Seattle plans evolved over
many years-in a way that increasingly reduced the significance of
race-showed both that the plans were narrowly tailored, and that other
race-neutral alternatives had not proved effective.72 Justice Breyer
finally accused Chief Justice Roberts of trying to eliminate all remedial
67. See id. at 2800-02; 2811-14.
68. See id. at 2809-11.
69. See id. at 2823-24.
70. See id. at 2815-18.
71. See id. at 2821-24.
72. See id. at 2824-31.
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uses of race, and of trying to wrest racial policymaking power from the
democratic process in a way that threatened the promise of Brown. 3
B. Doctrinal Difficulties
Serious doctrinal difficulties are posed by the Supreme Court's
decision invalidating the Louisville and Seattle integration plans in the
Resegregation case. The decision conflicts with the fundamental prem-
ises of Brown in at least two major respects. In addition, it relies on a
standard litany of racially regressive legal propositions that recent con-
servative-bloc Justices have insisted on reading into the Constitution.
These doctrinal difficulties are so pronounced that the motivation for the
Resegregation decision seems to be transparently political.
1. BROWN
Whatever one thinks of the outcome in the Resegregation case, the
decision seems pretty clearly to be in tension with the holding of Brown.
Brown firmly establishes the proposition that racially integrated schools
are constitutionally preferable to racially segregated schools. More sub-
tly, Brown also stands for the proposition that the white-supremacist
racial oppression underlying the separate-but-equal segregation regime
that Brown overruled was also constitutionally impermissible. Neverthe-
less, as I have argued in greater detail elsewhere,74 the Resegregation
decision seems to have overruled both of those fundamental aspects of
Brown.
Brown invalidated the separate-but-equal regime of Plessy and read
the Equal Protection Clause to require the desegregation of public
schools.75 In so doing, Brown held that racial segregation in public
schools was "inherently unequal."76 Nevertheless, the conservative-bloc
Justices in the Resegregation case read the Equal Protection Clause actu-
ally to protect "inherently unequal" resegregation. They invalidated
race-conscious efforts to prevent resegregation, even when those efforts
appeared to offer the only hope of preserving the post-Brown integration
that race-conscious remedies had been required to achieve.77 Justice
Breyer's dissent demonstrated the ways in which the Louisville and
Seattle integration plans had been narrowly tailored over time to prevent
73. See id. at 2833-37.
74. See Spann, supra note 18.
75. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
76. See id. at 495 ("Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
77. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2824-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that race-
neutral alternatives had proved inadequate); cf id. at 2791-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that some race-conscious remedies for de facto
segregation might be permissible if race-neutral alternatives were shown to be inadequate).
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racial resegregation, and thereby to advance the interest in educational
diversity that Grutter had found to be compelling.78 But Chief Justice
Roberts rejected that demonstration, stating that Grutter recognized only
a compelling interest in "holistic" diversity that also included individual-
ized nonracial factors-not an interest in racial diversity alone.79
Although the four dissenters strenuously disagreed,8" the Roberts rejec-
tion misses the point.
Ultimately, it does not matter whether Grutter authorizes the use of
race-conscious remedies to preserve racial diversity, because Brown
does. As a series of remedial cases implementing Brown has held, the
whole point of Brown was to achieve actual integration-not mere proc-
lamations of formal desegregation.81 If Brown is correct that separate
education "inherently" harms and stigmatizes racial-minority children,
those problems will not go away simply because resegregation is now
being achieved through residential housing patterns rather than through
school-attendance laws. Both produce the same racial separation, and
both produce the same attendant harms. The suggestion that one must
distinguish between the two types of segregation in order to implement
the only available segregation remedy is simply too precious to be plau-
sible. It amounts to merely another declaration of formal equality by
Chief Justice Roberts, which is analogous to the earlier southern segre-
gationist declarations that the post-Brown cases rejected as
unconstitutional.82
The Resegregation case is not only inconsistent with the actual inte-
gration principle of Brown and its progeny, it is inconsistent with
Brown's more fundamental aversion to racial oppression as well. In
addition to invalidating the racially segregated school systems that had
been maintained under the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy,83
Brown also invalidated the regime of white supremacy out of which
those segregated schools had emerged. Brown therefore stands for the
proposition that the interests of racial minorities cannot simply be sacri-
78. See id. at 2824-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 2753-55 (majority opinion) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324-25,
330, 337-38 (2003)).
80. See id. at 2800-01; 2824-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)
(authorizing race-conscious efforts to reflect racial balance of school district); N.C. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (invalidating ban on use of busing to achieve racial
balance); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971) (upholding voluntary race-conscious
school-assignment plan designed to achieve racial balance); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 437-38 (1968) (invalidating reliance on mere formal "freedom of choice" plans).
82. See cases cited supra note 81 (citing post-Brown cases that required actual integration
rather than mere formal equality).
83. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
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ficed in order to advance the interests of whites. Such a sacrifice would
convey the precise message of racial inferiority that Brown sought to
eradicate.84
This anti-oppression reading of Brown is important, because the
subordination of racial minorities has historically been a central feature
of United States culture. Moreover, it is a feature in whose maintenance
the Supreme Court has itself been heavily implicated. In Dred Scott v.
Sandford, the Court upheld the institution of slavery.85 In United States
v. Cruikshank, the Court limited the effectiveness of Reconstruction leg-
islation enacted to protect the rights of former black slaves.86 In the Civil
Rights Cases, the Court held that Reconstruction legislation could not
constitutionally prohibit private acts of discrimination against former
black slaves.87 In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court upheld the Jim Crow
regime of official southern segregation.88 In Korematsu v. United States,
the Court upheld the exclusion order that led to the World War II intern-
ment of Japanese American citizens.89 In Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown II), the Court delayed implementation of southern school deseg-
regation for a decade.9" In Naim v. Naim, the Court refused to invalidate
then-common miscegenation laws.9' In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court
84. See id. at 494 ("To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
85. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 452 (1857) (holding that blacks could not be citizens within
the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction and
invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery, as interfering with property
rights of slave owners).
86. 92 U.S. 542, 551-59 (1876) (refusing to apply criminal provisions of Enforcement Act of
1870 to Ku Klux Klan lynching of black freedmen); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 460-64 (5th ed. 2005) (describing Supreme Court restrictions on
Reconstruction legislation).
87. 109 U.S. 3, 8-19 (1883) (invalidating public accommodations provisions of Civil Rights
Act of 1875 and imposing "state action" restriction on congressional antidiscrimination
legislation); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 86, at 460-64 (describing Supreme Court
restrictions on Reconstruction legislation).
88. 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of separate-but-equal
regime of racial discrimination in public facilities, by finding that segregation did not constitute
unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause).
89. 323 U.S. 214, 215-20 (1944) (upholding World War II exclusion order that led to
Japanese American internment).
90. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (limiting desegregation obligation of public schools to that
which could be accomplished "with all deliberate speed"); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 86,
at 483-88 (describing Supreme Court inaction in face of massive southern resistance that followed
Brown).
91. 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (per curiam). In Naim, the United States Supreme Court was
asked to hold unconstitutional a Virginia miscegenation statute that had been upheld by the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. See id. The United States Supreme Court vacated the
Virginia decision and remanded for clarification of the record. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, however, merely reaffirmed its earlier decision and refused to clarify the record. Naim v.
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effectively prohibited the integration of northern schools.9 2 And even
now, the Supreme Court often uses a colorblind conception of Brown to
invalidate affirmative-action, redistricting, and integration programs of
which the Court disapproves. 93
Unfortunately, the Resegregation decision continues this trend of
Supreme Court involvement in the sacrifice of racial-minority rights for
the benefit of the white majority. In the aggregate, the Resegregation
Supreme Court had to choose between giving seats in racially
imbalanced schools to white students or to racial-minority students.
Because the seats were neither in magnet schools nor in any other way
related to merit, the only thing at stake was the racial composition of the
schools in which the seats were located. If the Court gave the seats to
minority students, the parents of white students would be inconve-
nienced by not sending their children to school in the locations that they
preferred. If the Court gave the seats to white students, the schools in
which those seats were located would become racially resegregated. The
Supreme Court chose to give the seats to the white students, thereby
sacrificing the inclusionary interests of minority students in an inte-
grated education to the exclusionary convenience interests of white par-
ents. Moreover, because white parents knew that resegregation would be
the result of overriding the integration plans that they sought to invali-
date, the "convenience" interest of disappointed white parents ended up
actually being an interest in renewed racial segregation. The Supreme
Court violated the anti-oppression principle of Brown when it allowed
white parents to send their children to schools that are attended by other
Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1956) (per curiam). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court
declined to recall or amend the mandate, finding that the constitutional question had not been
"properly presented." Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956) (per curiam). This allowed the
Virginia Court's decision to remain in effect. Id. Because the neutrality principle that had been
announced in Brown seemed to make the Virginia miscegenation statute unconstitutional, and
because the Supreme Court's failure to resolve Naim on the merits also seemed to violate a federal
statute giving the Supreme Court mandatory jurisdiction over the case, the Supreme Court's
actions in Naim have been vigorously criticized. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1964) ("[Tlhere are very few dismissals similarly indefensible in law."); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959)
(noting that dismissal of the miscegenation case was "wholly without basis in the law"). The
Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the Virginia miscegenation statute as a manifestation of
white supremacy eleven years later in Loving v. Virginia, when only sixteen states still had
miscegenation statutes on the books. 388 U.S. 1, 6, 11-12 (1967).
92. 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow inter-district judicial remedies
for de facto school segregation, thereby permitting suburban schools to remain predominantly
white and inner-city schools to remain overwhelmingly minority).
93. See SPANN, supra note 31, at 156-89 (discussing Supreme Court affirmative-action and
redistricting cases); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2751-54 (2007) (invalidating Louisville and Seattle integration plans).
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white students, rather than to schools that are attended by racial minori-
ties. In so doing, it allowed white parents of today to pursue the same
degree of racial separation that white parents of the separate-but-equal
generation were able to pursue before the Supreme Court overruled
Plessy in Brown.
2. RACIAL POLITICS
The Resegregation case Justices in the conservative bloc have con-
sistently voted against racial-minority interests.94 Indeed the voting
records of those Justices, combined with the tenor of their opinions in
race cases, is such that one cannot help but imagine that they would also
have voted with earlier Supreme Court majorities in cases like Dred
Scott,95 Plessy,96 and Korematsu.97 The majority, plurality, and concur-
ring opinions written by conservative-bloc Justices in the Resegregation
case invoke a standard litany of regressive legal propositions that ulti-
mately treats the Equal Protection Clause as a haven for existing white
privilege, rather than as a guarantee of racial equality. Although the dis-
senting opinions written by the Justices in the liberal bloc convincingly
challenge some of those propositions, the conservative-bloc majority
still subscribes to a conception of so-called "equality" that seems itself
to be racially discriminatory. The propositions that the conservative-bloc
Justices endorse seem both counterintuitive and unnecessary. If fact,
those propositions seem so gratuitous that it is difficult to view them as
emanating from anything other than a transparent form of conservative
racial politics.
(i) Strict Scrutiny.-The majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts
insists on applying strict scrutiny to all racial classifications, whether
they are benign or invidious.98 That means that race-conscious remedies
for existing discrimination are constitutionally just as suspect as the
underlying patterns of discrimination that they are designed to counter-
act. Although strict scrutiny is technically no longer "fatal in fact,"99
94. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33 (describing voting records of conservative-bloc
Justices in race cases).
95. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 452 (1857) (holding that blacks
could not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of
establishing diversity jurisdiction and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of
slavery as interfering with property rights of slave owners).
96. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of
separate-but-equal regime of racial discrimination in public facilities, by finding that segregation
did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause).
97. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-20 (1944) (upholding World War u
exclusion order that led to Japanese American internment).
98. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751-54 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 224, 227, 241 (1995)).
99. See id. at 2817 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237).
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Grutter remains the only case since Korematsu in which a racial classifi-
cation has survived strict equal-protection scrutiny.' t° Now that Justice
O'Connor is no longer on the Supreme Court,10' strict scrutiny is in the
hands of a conservative-bloc majority that has never voted in favor of
the racial-minority interest in any constitutional affirmative-action case.
That suggests that, under the Roberts Court, strict scrutiny will once
again become fatal in fact. I think that there is only one credible expla-
nation for why a Court would ignore the obvious differences that exist
between benign and invidious discrimination in fashioning and applying
a standard of review. The Court wants to preserve existing racial ine-
qualities by invalidating the remedies that would eliminate those ine-
qualities. That is, of course, a position that seems consistent with
contemporary conservative racial politics. Justice Kennedy is the only
conservative-bloc Justice who has stated that he could envision circum-
stances in which race-conscious discrimination remedies might be sub-
ject to less than strict scrutiny. °2 In practice, however, it remains true
that-in his twenty-year tenure on the Court-Justice Kennedy has still
never voted in favor of the racial-minority interest in any constitutional
affirmative-action case.10 3
(ii) Diversity.-To survive strict scrutiny, even a benign racial clas-
sification has to be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling govern-
mental interest."°  Although Grutter recognized the interest in
educational diversity to be compelling, the majority opinion of Chief
Justice Roberts in the Resegregation case has interpreted Grutter to
require "holistic" diversity that does not simply focus on racial diversity
alone.10 5 However, it is completely unclear why "holistic" diversity that
focuses on factors other than race should be required in an integration
plan that is designed to protect racial integration. Other forms of diver-
sity might be educationally desirable in other contexts, but they are sim-
ply inapposite when the prevention of racial resegregation is at stake.
The act of requiring such an unfocused and homogenized conception of
100. The only two cases in which a racial classification has survived strict equal-protection
scrutiny are the now-discredited World War II Japanese American exclusion case of Korematsu v.
United States, which upheld a World War II exclusion order that led to the internment of Japanese
Americans, 323 U.S. at 215-20, and the recent affirmative-action case of Grutter v. Bollinger,
which upheld the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative-action plan as a narrowly
tailored means of advancing a compelling interest in student diversity, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
101. See supra text accompanying note 16 (describing changes in Supreme Court personnel).
102. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
103. See supra text accompanying note 31 (describing voting records of conservative bloc
Justices in race cases).
104. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751-52.
105. See id. at 2753-54.
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diversity to satisfy the compelling-state-interest test seems like an act of
political opposition to the very idea of racial diversity that Brown
sought to infuse into the Constitution.
(iii) Narrow Tailoring.-Race-conscious student assignments
seemed so necessary to maintain integration in the Louisville and Seattle
school systems that there appeared to be no race-neutral alternative that
would effectively prevent resegregation. 0 6 Nevertheless, the conserva-
tive-bloc majority applied the narrow-tailoring requirement of strict
scrutiny with such harsh artificiality that it is realistically difficult to see
how that requirement could ever be satisfied. Once again, it seems that
only a Supreme Court majority that was politically hostile to racial inte-
gration itself would go to such lengths to find that strict scrutiny had not
been satisfied in the Resegregation case.
(iv) Racial Balance.-Because the Louisville and Seattle integra-
tion plans did seem narrowly tailored to preserve the diversity benefits
of racial integration, Chief Justice Roberts had to find some way of ren-
dering that particular form of narrow tailoring doctrinally irrelevant. He
did this by characterizing the integration interest of the school boards as
merely an effort to achieve "racial balance, pure and simple,"10 7 which
previous cases had held to be "patently unconstitutional.""1 8 A question
that immediately leaps to mind is why the Court would want to deem
remedial racial balancing patently unconstitutional. The effort to have a
school's student body reflect the racial composition of the district in
which the school is located, seems like an imminently sensible way of
promoting racial integration. Moreover, post-Brown remedy cases, such
as Swann"°9 and McDaniel v. Barresi,"1 ° expressly authorized the use of
racial balance as a constitutionally permissible goal in formulating
desegregation plans.' The suggestion that remedial efforts to promote
racial balance are unconstitutional seems simply perverse. In a nondis-
criminatory culture, one would expect societal resources to be distrib-
uted in a racially proportional manner. Therefore, efforts to replicate the
results that would be produced by a nondiscriminatory culture hardly
seem to merit Supreme Court condemnation as a form of unconstitu-
106. See id. at 2824-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 2755 (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 2753 (majority opinion) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003));
see also id. at 2755-58, 2763 (plurality opinion) (discussing plans as method of racial planning);
id. at 2768-70 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating school interest not constitutionally permitted).
109. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (authorizing race-
conscious efforts to reflect racial balance of school district).
110. 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971) (upholding voluntary race-conscious school assignment plan
designed to achieve racial balance).
11. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing cases
authorizing pursuit of racial balance).
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tional discrimination. Political opposition to racial integration seems yet
again to be the most plausible explanation for this curious and doctri-
nally unnecessary Supreme Court holding.
(v) Societal Discrimination.-After having characterized the Louis-
ville and Seattle school boards as being interested in promoting racial
balance, Chief Justices Roberts went on to condemn the school boards
for seeking to remedy general "societal discrimination."' 12 Once again,
one cannot help but wonder what is wrong with trying to remedy general
societal discrimination. The doctrinal answer seems to be that govern-
mental entities can remedy only that discrimination for which they them-
selves are responsible. 11 3 They apparently cannot seek to remedy the
more subtle forms of pervasive discrimination that continue to permeate
the culture without any particularized causal connection to an identifi-
able act of discrimination. The problem, of course, is that the lingering
effects of those more pervasive forms of societal discrimination are pre-
cisely what one wants to remedy if one is genuinely interested in pro-
moting prospective racial equality. This so-called "societal
discrimination" is what is responsible for the bulk of the racial inequal-
ity that exists today. The conservative-bloc Justices might argue that
they are only prohibiting the use of race-conscious remedies to combat
general societal discrimination. 1 4 But that is hardly an adequate
response in a context where race-conscious remedies offer the only real-
istic means to escape the continuing effects of pervasive societal dis-
crimination. Conservative political approval of continuing racial
inequality again seems to supply the most plausible explanation for the
Court's counterintuitive "societal discrimination" rule.
(vi) De Facto Discrimination. -The conservative-bloc Justices are
emphatic in their insistence that race conscious remedies can only be
used for de jure, and not de facto, discrimination." 5 Indeed, Justice
Thomas argues that de facto racial imbalance does not even count as
"resegregation," despite the racially identifiable character of the schools
that results." 6 Justice Breyer challenges the conservative-bloc emphasis
on the de facto versus de jure distinction, arguing that the distinction
itself is too tenuous to be meaningful. He notes that both the Louisville
112. Id. at 2758 (plurality opinion) (rejecting remedies for "societal discrimination"); see also
id. at 2772 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same).
113. See id. at 2758 (plurality opinion) (limiting permissible remedies to discrimination caused
by entity seeking to provide remedy); id. at 2772 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same).
114. See id. at 2758 (plurality opinion) (discussing limits on use of race-conscious remedies);
id. at 2772 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same).
115. See id. at 2752 (majority opinion); id. at 2761-64 (plurality opinion); id. at 2768-73
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2794-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
116. See id. at 2768-73 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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and Seattle school systems started out as school systems alleged to be de
jure segregated, and only the happenstance of a settlement rather than an
adjudication caused those two school systems to occupy different de
facto and de jure categories. I17 In a culture where governmental involve-
ment in private affairs has become as extensive as it is in contemporary
United States culture, Justice Breyer certainly seems correct that the de
facto/de jure distinction is ultimately untenable. But the more interesting
question is why a Court would care whether demonstrable discrimina-
tion was of a de facto or a de jure nature. If a remedy appeared to be the
only effective remedy for counteracting racial discrimination, why
would that alone not be enough to make the remedy constitutionally
available? This, of course, poses the very same problem that was posed
by the aversion of conservative-bloc Justices to societal discrimination,
and it raises the very same concern about the racial politics of those
Justices.
(vii) Colorblindness.-Perhaps the most striking feature of the
Resegregation decision is the insistence of Chief Justice Roberts that
invalidation of the Louisville and Seattle race-conscious integration
plans was compelled by some purported, race-neutrality requirement of
Brown.'18 Justice Thomas even traced his supposed moral imperative for
colorblindness all the way back to Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy.'19
However, Brown and the Plessy dissent stand for no such requirement.
Those opinions were about the invidious use of race to oppress racial
minorities. They were not about the remedial use of race to undo the
effects of past discrimination. Brown prohibited the assignment of chil-
dren to schools based on the color of their skin as a way of combating
the white privilege and attitudes of white supremacy that prevailed at the
time. The Roberts Court majority prohibits the assignment of children to
schools based on the color of their skin as a way of preserving the white
privilege and attitudes of white supremacy that prevail today.
By ripping the Brown decision out of context, and forcing it to
stand for the opposite of the proposition that it was intended to support, I
think that the conservative-bloc Justices were themselves guilty of racial
discrimination. Their insistence on prospective colorblind race neutrality
has both the intent and the effect of protecting the existing allocation of
societal resources from remedial attempts at redistribution. Moreover,
they intend this result even though they know that the existing distribu-
117. See id. at 2809-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 2767-68 (plurality opinion) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493-94 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955)).
119. See id. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
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tion of societal resources remains highly tainted by the continuing
effects of past discrimination. Justices in the conservative bloc choose to
accept the present distribution of resource as a legitimate baseline allo-
cation, and they insist upon perpetuating the inequalities built into that
baseline by giving those inequalities constitutional protection. They read
the Equal Protection Clause to constitutionalize a concept of equality
that has a hidden discriminatory core. It is a form of equality that, when
expedient, can itself be used to continue the sacrifice of racial-minority
interests for the benefit of more privileged whites.
For Chief Justice Roberts, the complex and intractable problem of
racial discrimination that has plagued the United States since before its
inception is amenable to a simple solution. Roberts ends his Resegrega-
tion opinion by stating that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 12 0 Such a
simplistic solution would appeal only to someone who was wholly
unconcerned with the need for genuine racial equality. The conservative
racial politics underlying the Roberts Court's Resegregation decision
belies the supposedly apolitical constitutional exposition that is offered
to support its result. The Roberts Court now simply lacks racial credibil-
ity in our post-Realist legal culture. The Resegregation Justices who
have joined the Court's conservative voting bloc can no longer claim the
mantle of good faith. As a result, they no longer merit the benefit of the
doubt or our continued doctrinal respect. But one must still wonder why
those Justices chose to invert the constitutional concept of equality in the
way that they have. It may be that conservative-bloc Supreme Court
Justices are not simply conservatives, but rather, are "movement
conservatives."
II. MOVEMENT CONSERVATISM
In his book The Conscious of a Liberal, Princeton economist Paul
Krugman argues that "movement conservatives" have adopted a radical,
right-wing political strategy that seeks to dismantle the New Deal wel-
fare state.' 2 ' The effect of this dismantling is to increase economic ine-
quality through the transfer of resources and governmental subsidies
from the middle class to the wealthy. The strategy seems to be working.
In his book Richistan: A Journey Through the American Wealth Boom
and the Lives of the New Rich, Wall Street Journal reporter Robert
Frank argues that the present divergence in wealth between the rich and
the middle class has now become so vast that the rich should be viewed
120. Id. at 2768 (plurality opinion); see also supra note 43 (discussing ancestry of this
aphorism).
121. KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 3-14.
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as residents of a different country-a country in which values and cul-
tural practices are dramatically different from those prevailing in the
mainstream United States.' 22 The negative redistribution of wealth
achieved by movement conservatism has been a noteworthy political
accomplishment. Any transfer of wealth from the middle class to the
rich, of course, directly disadvantages the middle-class electorate. In
addition, the increased economic inequality created by this large diver-
gence in wealth ultimately forces members of the middle class to out-
spend their resources trying to keep pace in the quest for basic middle-
class goals.123 Therefore, in order to convince middle-class voters to
support the movement-conservative political agenda of the wealthy,
movement conservatives had to form a political coalition around an
issue that a sufficient number of middle-class voters cared about even
more than they cared about their own economic interests. Movement
conservatives chose to do this by exploiting the issue of race. Both the
plutocratic nature of movement conservatism and the movement's skill
at manipulating racial anxieties are worthy of attention.
A. Plutocracy
Movement conservatism is plutocratic in nature. A small, wealthy
segment of the population has managed to capture the national political
process so that governmental policies operate to advance their own inter-
ests, rather than the interests of the population at large. This governing
plutocracy is defined by both its wealth and its ideology. Moreover, its
political policies have benefited the rich by greatly increasing the
nation's divergence in wealth.' 24 However, divergence in wealth is not
what has fostered our present political polarization. Rather it is political
polarization that has fostered our present divergence in wealth. 125
1. WEALTH DIVERGENCE
Much of the wealth in the United States is now held by a small
percentage of the population. The top ten percent of the population earns
44.3% of the nation's total income, and the top one percent earns
17.4%.126 Moreover, the richest one percent of Americans now controls
more than thirty-three percent of the nation's wealth, and the wealth of
122. ROBERT FRANK, RICHISTAN: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE AMERICAN WEALTH BOOM AND
THE LIVES OF THE NEW RICH 1-13 (2007).
123. See id. at 242-45; ROBERT H. FRANK, FALLING BEHIND: How RISING INEQUALITY HARMS
THE MIDDLE CLASS 43-51, 78-94, 117-25 (2007). Note that, despite their similar names, the two
"Frank" authors are different people.
124. See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 9-12.
125. See id. at 6-7, 124-52, 169-72.
126. Id. at 16 tbl.l (reporting 2005 data).
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the top one percent now exceeds the wealth of the bottom ninety per-
cent. 2 7 Nevertheless, the absolute number of wealthy households in the
United States is both large and growing. In addition, some wealthy
households are now very wealthy. There are 7.5 million households in
the United States with a net worth between $1 million and $10 million;
1.4 million households with a net worth between $10 million and $100
million; thousands of households with a net worth between $100 million
and $1 billion (the exact number is unknown); and estimates range from
400 to over 1000 households with a net worth exceeding $1 billion
(again the exact number is unknown).128 The number of wealthy house-
holds in the United States has also been increasing rapidly in recent
years. In the near decade between 1995 and 2004, the number of house-
holds in most wealth categories actually doubled, with many new
wealthy households earning their money in soaring financial markets
rather through the more traditional route of inheritance. The population
of millionaires tripled between the 1980s and 2000, and the number of
billionaires jumped from thirteen in 1982 to sixty-seven in 1989.129
Households that have recently acquired their wealth tend to be
younger and more diverse than those with Old Money. Nevertheless,
single digit millionaires tend to be politically homogeneous, with most
typically voting as conservative Republicans.13° Those higher up on the
wealth scale, who may feel financially more secure with their wealth,
are more likely to be liberal democrats. Single digit millionaires sup-
ported George W. Bush in 2004, while those worth $10 million or more
supported John Kerry.' Self-financed candidates who spent between
$1 million and $4 million on their own campaigns tended to be Republi-
cans, but those who spent $4 million or more on their own campaigns
tended to be Democrats by a ratio of three-to-one. 132 Republicans are
more likely than Democrats to make political contributions in the
$25,000 to $100,000 range, but Democrats are more likely to make
political contributions that exceed $1 million.'33
It would not be particularly surprising to learn that wealth-espe-
cially newly acquired wealth at the single-digit end of the millionaire
scale-would cause people to favor fiscally conservative political poli-
cies that removed obstacles to their accumulation and retention of
greater wealth. Accordingly, wealth might naturally generate a degree of
127. FRANK, supra note 122, at 242.
128. Id. at 7-12 (using 2004 and 2005 data).
129. Id. at 1-2, 6.
130. See id. at 6-9.
131. See id. at 10.
132. Id. at 186-87.
133. See id. at 201.
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political polarization, causing the wealthy not only to oppose subsidies
to the poor, but also to favor negative redistribution policies that benefit
the wealthy at the expense of the middle class. Such policies include
reductions in progressive taxation, elimination of the estate tax, hostility
to organized labor, facilitation of high executive pay, hostility to govern-
mental regulation, privatization of social security, and rollbacks in other
New Deal social-welfare programs. 134 While many among the wealthy
do, in fact, support such policies, what is surprising is Professor Krug-
man's conclusion that the causal arrow actually points in the opposite
direction.
2. POLITICAL POLARIZATION
Professor Krugman argues that it is not the divergence in wealth
between the rich and the middle class that has caused the political polari-
zation that now exists between conservative Republicans and liberal
Democrats. Rather, it is political polarization that has caused the present
divergence in wealth. 35 Beginning in the mid 1970s, radical right-wing
ideologues who were opposed to big government spearheaded a political
movement that ultimately succeeded in taking over the Republican
Party. The movement was joined by corporate lobbyists; independent oil
producers; neo-conservative intellectuals who favored hard-line posi-
tions on defense and foreign policy; supply-side economists opposed to
progressive taxation; social conservatives; old-line anti-communists;
welfare opponents; anti-union business interests; anti-environmentalists;
proponents of the religious right; opponents of social security; propo-
nents of social-security privatization; opponents of the inheritance tax;
and opponents of governmental regulation in general. 136 The effect of
these movement-conservative policies was to benefit the wealthy at the
expense of the poor and the middle class. However, Ronald Reagan was
successfully able to depict movement-conservative ideological prefer-
ences as populist political policies, in a way that appealed to a wide
enough segment of the electorate to generate initial electoral victories.
As a result of those initial victories, wealthy Republicans became will-
ing to provide the additional funding needed to secure the present domi-
nance of movement-conservative policies in the Republican Party. 137
Movement-conservative dominance of the Republican Party has
thus far extended from the 1980 presidential election of Ronald Reagan
134. See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 7, 10-11.
135. See id. at 6-7, 124-52, 169-72.
136. See id. at 159-69, 171.
137. See id. at 171-72.
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through the current Bush/Cheney administration.138 Using its ample
sources of funding, movement conservatism has exerted influence
through an interlocking network of people and institutions. This network
has included traditional politicians; a strong business base; media orga-
nizations; think-tank intellectuals; and publishing companies. The goal
of movement conservatism has been to the secure political success by
wielding hegemonic power over the nation's political culture. In the pur-
suit of that end, movement conservatives have used authoritarian control
techniques to purge the Republican Party of its moderate members and
to ensure the loyalty of the Party's remaining members. Those tech-
niques have included the use of strong financial incentives to influence
political behavior; the imposition of strict political discipline on Party
candidates and governmental officials; the use of political patronage to
fill governmental jobs; the extension of prestigious job offers to loyal
public officials after governmental service; the use of targeted press cov-
erage for candidates and issues; the provision of selective access to sup-
portive lobbyists; and even the use of political and economic dirty tricks,
including the disenfranchisement of opposition voters.' 39
In a very real sense, movement conservatism is a contemporary
plutocracy in which a small class of wealthy ideological elites guides the
formation of political and social policy in a way that advances its own
interests. Krugman argues that movement conservatism is the contempo-
rary analog to the wealthy robber-baron plutocracy that ruled over the
formation of governmental policies in the "Long Gilded Age" that fol-
lowed the Civil War and extended in one form or another until the
Depression.140 Movement conservatism has been wildly successful in
producing income inequality. But, because of its plutocratic nature, it
has also been wildly undemocratic. 4 ' Conservative ideologues, with
disproportionate political power, have overseen a political process that
has made significant cutbacks in social-welfare programs. The wealthy
lead lifestyles in which they already purchase basic social services such
as education, security, health care, and retirement benefits for them-
selves, rather than relying on the government to provide those ser-
vices.142 As a result, the wealthy are not harmed by cutbacks in social-
welfare programs that harm other segments of the population. Moreover,
the economic harms produced by those cutbacks are not just confined to
the poor, but are also inflicted on the middle-class electorate-an electo-
138. See id. at 9-12.
139. See id. at 118-121, 163-69.
140. See id. at 21-26.
141. See id. at 10-11, 267.
142. See FRANK, supra note 122, at 242-45.
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rate that is more likely than the poor to vote.' 4 3 That posed a problem for
movement conservatives in their effort to garner support for their politi-
cal agenda.
B. The Role of Race
Because the economic policies of movement conservatism exacer-
bate economic inequality by increasing concentrations of wealth in a
small percentage of the population, middle-class voters should oppose
the regressive taxation and cutback in the welfare state that movement
conservatives favor. 144 Nevertheless, movement conservatives were suc-
cessfully able to capture middle-class voters for their political coalition,
primarily by exploiting the issue of race. Correctly surmising that a large
enough number of middle-class voters would harbor racial prejudices
intense enough to override their own economic interests, movement-
conservative political candidates made tacit appeals to the xenophobic
racial anxieties that those middle-class voters possessed. The strategy
worked particularly well for southern white voters, who responded by
switching their longstanding political allegiance from the Democratic to
the Republican Party.145
1. RACIAL ANXIETIES
Voters do not always vote their own interests, but they typically do.
Since the 1970s, when movement conservatism began to take hold, pub-
lic support for social-welfare programs has actually increased. Neverthe-
less, while the electorate has moved to the left on this issue, movement-
conservative Republicans have been winning elections. 4 6 Thomas
Frank's book What's the Matter with Kansas? argues that middle-class
voters have simply been duped by conservatives into voting for policies
that harm their own economic interests. 147 However, Krugman argues
that middle-class voters have not so much been duped as seduced by
coded forms of race baiting.1 48
Conservatives have traditionally been hostile to the interests of
racial minorities. In 1957, William F. Buckley explicitly argued in his
magazine, the National Review, that southern whites should take
whatever measures were necessary to dominate blacks politically and
culturally-including disenfranchisement, disregard of democratic
143. See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 192-94.
144. See id. at 172.
145. See id. at 177-83, 197.
146. See id. at 176.
147. See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? How CONSERVATIVES WON
THE HEART OF AMERICA 1-10 (First Owl Books 2005) (2004).
148. See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 177.
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majority rule, and even violence-because the white race was the
advanced race.149 Although such sentiments are rarely expressed so
openly today, vestiges of the underlying sentiment appear to persist.
Accordingly, when Ronald Reagan began his 1976 presidential cam-
paign, he invoked the image of a "welfare queen" in seeking political
support for his assault on the New Deal welfare state. Cultural stereo-
types were such that he did not have to mention the race of his fictitious
welfare queen. Reagan then began his 1980 presidential campaign with a
states' rights speech delivered in Philadelphia, Mississippi-a city
where three civil-rights workers had been murdered in 1964, during the
height of the civil-rights movement. The race-baiting message was again
transmitted without ever explicitly having to mention race. 
150
What Ronald Reagan did was show movement conservatives how
they could appeal to white middle-class racial prejudices in understated
ways that were acceptable in polite conversation. Having mastered those
techniques, movement conservatives then successfully forced an associ-
ation between poverty and race in the minds of middle-class voters. That
enabled movement conservatives to enlist the aid of white middle-class
voters in resisting redistributive social-welfare programs-even when
those programs would benefit the white middle class. Movement con-
servatives were able to do this by depicting disfavored redistributive ini-
tiatives as programs designed to aid racial minorities. 5 ' Tacit appeals to
voter racism, therefore, supplied a boost to the movement-conservative
political agenda. When that boost was combined with the movement-
conservative support that came from national-security hawks, the relig-
ious right, and the disenfranchisement of lower-income workers, move-
ment conservatives had secured the political support needed not only to
dominate the Republican Party, but to prevail on many of the national
policy issues that they favored as well.' 52
2. SOUTHERN WHITE VOTERS
Krugman is precise in his identification of the voters for whom the
movement-conservative race-baiting strategy worked. The strategy
worked on southern white voters.' 5 3 Prior to the rise of movement con-
servatism, the South had been strongly Democratic. That was because
the Republican Party was still viewed in the South as the party of Abra-
ham Lincoln-the President who is commonly viewed as having freed
149. See id. at 101-04.
150. See id. at 178-79.
151. See id. at 179.
152. See id. at 183-94.
153. See id. at 179-83.
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the slaves.' 54 In addition, Democrats had secured southern support for
the New Deal welfare state by tolerating continued racial segregation in
the South. '5 The rise of the civil-rights movement in the 1960s, how-
ever, caused the South to break with the Democratic party.
When President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of
1964, he correctly predicted that he had just delivered the South to the
Republican Party for the rest of his lifetime. 56 In 1964, Barry Goldwa-
ter's arch-conservative, states' rights presidential campaign emphasized
his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although Goldwater was
soundly defeated in the national election, all of the states that Goldwater
won outside of his home state of Arizona were in the South. 157 Much of
the South then voted for segregationist George Wallace in 1968, and
Ronald Reagan was able to win southern states with coded appeals to
segregationists in 1980.158 Although the Republican Party had taken
control of Congress and the White House by 2004, in the fifty years that
elapsed between 1954 and 2004, the Democrats actually gained seats
outside the South in the House of Representatives. The Democratic loss
of power was produced entirely by the switch of southern voters from
the Democratic to the Republican Party. Moreover, the voters who
switched their party allegiance were white.'59 In 1954, southern voters
were heavily Democratic at all income levels. By 2004, however, white
Southern Democratic support had eroded. Although low-income white
southerners were still as likely to vote Democratic as low-income voters
in the rest of the country, middle- and upper-income white Southerners
had by then become disproportionately Republican. 6 ° In both the 2000
and 2004 presidential elections, whites outside the South favored George
W. Bush by modest margins, but white Southerners favored Bush by
margins of thirty-five percent or more. That was enough white southern
154. In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, which stated
that "all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof
[are] in rebellion against the United States, [are henceforward], and forever free." Abraham
Lincoln, A Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), reprinted in JOHN HOPE FRANKJ LIN, THE EMANCIPATION
PROCLAMATION 96 (1963). In fact, the Emancipation Proclamation purported to free the slaves
only in southern states that had seceded from the Union-states that, because of their secession,
no longer recognized the authority of President Lincoln. Lincoln did not purport to free the slaves
in northem states, which did recognize his authority, or in areas of the South that were under
federal occupation. See FRANKLIN, supra, at 141-42, 151-53. Slavery was later abolished
throughout the United States in 1865, with the adoption of the post-Civil War Thirteenth
Amendment. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII.
155. See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 180-81.
156. See id. at 99.
157. See id. at 181.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 182.
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support to offset the heavily Democratic vote of black Southerners, and
to give Bush two presidential-election victories that he would not have
been able to obtain without the support of white southern voters.
16
'
The movement-conservative strategy of equating governmental
social-welfare spending with handouts to blacks in the minds of middle-
class white voters also seems to have been effective. In general, the
higher a state's black population is in percentage terms, the lower that
state's per-person spending will be on social-welfare programs. Moreo-
ver, opposition to social-welfare spending has historically been linked to
race. In the late 1940s, President Truman sought to implement a univer-
sal-health-care plan that would have resembled our current Medicare
program. Although the plan had overwhelming public support, it was
never adopted-in part because Southern whites who would have bene-
fited from the plan opposed it out of fear that it would lead to racially
integrated hospitals. 162 It remains to be seen how much of our contem-
porary failure to adopt universal health care can be explained by the
continuing link between social-welfare spending and racial-minority
interests in the minds of middle-class voters.
There is one other significant way in which movement conserva-
tives have been able to use racial antipathy to advance their political
agenda. That is through the use of voter fraud. Voter fraud has always
been a staple of electoral politics in the United States, taking forms rang-
ing from physical voter intimidation to less transparent forms of vote
suppression. Movement conservatives have in the past utilized vote-sup-
pression tactics to disenfranchise racial-minority voters. For example, in
the 2000 presidential election, Florida's Republican Secretary of State
Katherine Harris purged eligible voters from the voting rolls by falsely
identifying those voters as felons. The purged voters were disproportion-
ately black, and George W. Bush would not have been elected President
if those voters had not erroneously been excluded from the election. 1
63
In 2005, Justice Department staff lawyers refused to approve a voter-
identification law passed by the Republican Georgia legislature on the
ground that the law was likely to discriminate against black voters in
violation of the Voting Rights Act. Nevertheless, their decision was sim-
ply overruled by the Republican political appointees who ran the Bush
Justice Department. The reversal was part of an orchestrated movement-
conservative strategy to transform Justice Department voting rights
"enforcement" into a mechanism for suppressing racial-minority
161. Id.
162. Id. at 179-80.
163. See id. at 195.
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votes. 16 4 We do not yet know the degree to which electronic voting
machine corruption has in the past or will in the future lead to
undercounting of racial-minority votes, although such electronic voter
fraud now seems technologically available to those with an inclination to
use it.'
6 5
According to Krugman, the movement-conservative story is a fairly
simple one. Movement conservatives do, in fact, constitute the "vast
right-wing conspiracy" that they are often alleged to comprise, and they
have successfully taken control of the Republican Party. They have
moved governmental policies sharply to the right, in a way that has
exacerbated the divergence of wealth in the United States. The resulting
concentration of wealth in a small segment of the population has harmed
and alienated middle-class voters to the extent that those voters are now
gradually moving toward the Democratic Party. But move-
ment-conservative Republicans have thus far been able to offset this
leftward shift by exploiting the racial prejudices of white middle-class
voters in sufficient numbers to secure and maintain political domination
of the South. 166 And the Supreme Court has helped.
III. THE CONSCIENCE OF A COURT
It has been clear to me for some time now that an important func-
tion of the Supreme Court in United States culture has been to facilitate
the sacrifice of racial-minority interests for the benefit of the white
majority. 167 However, it has never been clear to me why the Court would
care so much about actively promoting such racial exploitation. Because
the Supreme Court is at bottom a political institution, I would have
expected the Court to reflect the prevailing racial attitudes of the elite,
white, majority constituents that it represents. But that does not explain
why the Court would want to nullify concessions that a democratic
majority voluntarily chose to accord racial minorities. Nevertheless, that
is what the Court did in the Resegregation case and in numerous other
affirmative-action cases over the last thirty years. 168 The Krugman the-
164. See id. The Supreme Court has since upheld from facial attack the constitutional and
Voting-Rights-Act validity of a partisan Indiana voter-identification law that was alleged to have a
discriminatory impact on minority voters and other classes of voters who tended to vote
Democratic. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1613-15, 1623-24
(2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
165. See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 196-97.
166. See id. at 180.
167. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAFNST THE COURT 19-26, 94-99, 104-60 (1993)
(arguing that Supreme Court has historically performed "veiled majoritarian" function of
sacrificing racial-minority interests for benefit of white majority).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33 (discussing Supreme Court conservative voting
bloc).
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sis, however, suggests an explanation for this judicial behavior. Krug-
man argues that movement conservatives have intentionally used tacit
appeals to white racial antipathy as the bond that holds its Republican
political coalition together. I view the five-Justice conservative voting
bloc that has dominated the Supreme Court for the last twenty years as
simply the doctrinal arm of the movement-conservative political
machine.
One aspect of the movement-conservative strategy that has made it
so successful is the multi-pronged network that it uses to advance its
political agenda. Movement-conservative operatives include not just pol-
iticians, but business leaders, media moguls, publishers, and intellectu-
als. 16 9 I think that the Supreme Court has also served as a political
operative for the movement-conservative mission. Unlike the intellectual
arm of the movement, whose task has been to offer justifications for the
Republican political agenda that are rooted in economic and political
theory, 70 the function of the Supreme Court has been to offer justifica-
tions that are rooted in constitutional law. Because the Court is widely
viewed as possessing the institutional competence required for constitu-
tional exposition, a significant segment of the population will typically
accept the Court's constitutional pronouncements. That is particularly
true when the Court reads the Constitution to coincide with views and
preferences that are already shared by those segments of the population.
Stated more succinctly, movement conservatives need their exploitation
of racial-minority interests to be perceived as culturally legitimate,
because most of the white middle-class potential supporters that the
movement targets do not think of themselves as openly racist. The
Supreme Court helps to satisfy that need by making such racial exploita-
tion constitutionally permissible. Indeed, the Court sometimes deems
such exploitation to be constitutionally compelled.
The Resegregation case illustrates the manner in which the Court
can comfort movement-conservative voters by reading the Constitution
to protect segregation, despite Brown's repudiation of Plessy.'7 ' The
Resegregation case, of course, enables white, middle-class, Republican
voters to send their children to white, de facto segregated schools-
rather than to schools that are also attended by racial-minority children.
But the case also does much more. It gives white, middle-class, Republi-
can voters constitutional "cover" for their racially discriminatory prefer-
ences. Thanks to the Court, neither the attitudes nor the behavior of the
169. See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 115-20, 163-69.
170. See id. at 115-20.
171. See supra Part I.B.I (arguing that Resegregation case overruled Brown and reinstated
separate-but-equal regime of Plessy).
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movement-conservative Republican electorate can properly be con-
demned on the ground of supposed racial intolerance. Rather, such atti-
tudes and behavior should be congratulated, because they coincide with
a proper appreciation of what the constitutional concept of equality sup-
posedly requires. By thus inverting the concepts of equality and discrim-
ination, the Supreme Court places its constitutional seal of approval on
the movement-conservative tactic of race baiting.' 2 Use of the Supreme
Court as the doctrinal arm of the movement-conservative political pro-
gram may well be racially expedient. I suspect that conservative-bloc
Justices may even believe, as a matter of conscience, that they are acting
in a way that will benefit the nation. But, I also believe, that as a matter
of conscience, the conservative bloc has implicated the Supreme Court
in the process of intentional discrimination.
A. Intentional Discrimination
The Supreme Court has taught us that intentional discrimination
based on race is virtually always unconstitutional.173 Therefore, when
the Supreme Court conservative-bloc majority actively chooses to read
the Equal Protection Clause in a way that benefits white movement con-
servatives at the expense of racial minorities, the Court is violating its
own reading of the Constitution. As true as that insight might be, it
yields only rhetorical benefits, because the Justices are not likely to hold
their own adjudicatory actions unconstitutional. Nevertheless, we are not
precluded from detecting the hypocrisy entailed in a reading of the Con-
stitution that actually promotes racial discrimination. The Court can
hardly claim that it is merely following the dictates of the Constitution,
because the doctrinal indeterminacy surrounding the words "equal pro-
tection" is far too vast to impose any meaningful constraint on the exer-
cise of judicial policymaking discretion. 174 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has a long history of insensitivity to the rights of racial minorities,
thereby lending further credibility to the claim that the current Court is
172. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20 (discussing Supreme Court inversion of
concepts of equality and discrimination).
173. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (holding that intentional
discrimination triggers strict scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause). The only two cases in which
a racial classification has survived strict equal-protection scrutiny are the now-discredited World
War II Japanese American exclusion case of Korematsu v. United States, which upheld a World
War H exclusion order that led to the internment of Japanese Americans, 323 U.S. 214, 215-20
(1944), and the recent affirmative-action case of Grutter v. Bollinger, which upheld the University
of Michigan Law School's affirmative-action plan as a narrowly tailored means of advancing the
compelling interest in student diversity, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
174. See generally SPANN, supra note 167, at 26-82 (arguing that doctrine cannot constrain
judicial discretion).
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simply ruling against racial minorities for political reasons. 175 There are
at least two interesting tactics that the Court has used to promote move-
ment-conservative racial divisiveness, while making its own intentional
discrimination against racial minorities seem legitimate.
1. DOG-WHISTLE POLITICS
"Dog-whistle politics" is a British term used to describe a rhetorical
technique that enables a speaker to send a charged message to a target
audience, while simultaneously sending an innocuous version of that
message to a general audience. 176 Like the sound of a dog whistle, only
the intended audience can "hear" the charged message that is transmitted
for its benefit. When George W. Bush denominated himself a "compas-
sionate conservative," his general audience understood him to be provid-
ing assurance that he would not unduly undermine the social-welfare
safety net that had been in place since the New Deal. However, his tar-
get audience understood that Bush was actually making reference to a
religious-right mode of thought that favored dispensing charity and
religion together through private faith-based initiatives, rather than
through secular governmental programs. 7 7 Similarly, when Ronald Rea-
gan wished to appeal to the racist sentiments of his target voters, without
alienating general voters who might be offended by a more explicit
invocation of race, he relied on dog-whistle politics to conjure up the
image of a "welfare queen"-whose abuse of governmental generosity
stereotypically implied all that needed to be said about her race. 78
The Supreme Court is also able to use dog-whistle politics as a
means of transmitting coded messages to a target audience, without
explicitly disclosing a deeper meaning to a more general audience. In
fact, the Court can use doctrinal exposition to transmit coded messages
to its movement-conservative allies that have the opposite meaning of
the messages received by general readers of the Court's opinions. Such
dog-whistle adjudication has the effect of making Supreme Court opin-
ions seem facially plausible, while actually producing a political effect
that would undermine the Court's credibility if advanced directly.
In the Resegregation case, the insistence by Chief Justice Roberts
that invalidation of the Louisville and Seattle integration plans was
required by some colorblind, race neutrality requirement of Brown is an
example of politically-motivated, dog-whistle adjudication. As has been
175. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93 (describing Supreme Court history of hostility
to racial-minority interests).
176. See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 102.
177. See id. at 190-91.
178. See id. at 178.
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discussed, those who understand the historical and doctrinal contexts out
of which Brown emerged realize that the Roberts Court was actually
overruling rather than following the holding in Brown.17 9 Nevertheless,
the Roberts opinions had a different effect on two other audiences. The
target audience for the opinion consisted of parents who did want to
steer their children to racially segregated schools, but who did not want
to be viewed as racists because of their efforts to do so. Justice Roberts
assured those parents that Brown could be manipulated to encompass
their racial preferences in a way that was consistent with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Constitution. The more general audience for the
opinion simply accepted the colorblind, race-neutrality rhetoric of the
Roberts opinions, because that audience had neither a personal stake in
the outcome nor a doctrinal understanding of how the Brown precedent
was being manipulated. By employing the adjudicatory version of dog-
whistle politics, the Roberts Court tried to satisfy the discriminatory
desires of its favored political constituents without losing the legitimacy
needed to continue engaging in constitutional exposition that would be
acceptable to the population at large. Although I hope that the Court will
now be perceived as having overstepped the bounds of doctrinal plausi-
bility in its Resegregation decision, it remains to be seen whether my
hopes will be realized.
2. WATERBOARDING
The second tactic that the Supreme Court has used to maintain its
perceived legitimacy, while actually engaging in movement-conserva-
tive racial politics, is a technique that I refer to as "waterboarding."
Although I think that the Court has had to torture constitutional doctrine
in order to reach the result that it reached in the Resegregation case, that
is not why I use the term. Rather, I use the term metaphorically to
represent a rhetorical tactic that rests on the practice of doctrinal diver-
sion. Many people consider the extremely unpleasant interrogation tech-
nique of waterboarding to be a form of torture that is now illegal under
United States and international law.180 Rather than announcing that the
United States will no longer use waterboarding as an interrogation tech-
nique, however, the Bush Administration has instead initiated a debate
about whether waterboarding does or does not technically constitute
179. See supra text accompanying notes 118-120 (discussing use of "colorblindness" to
overrule principles established by Brown).
180. See Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of
International Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89, 89-96 (2007)
(discussing legality of waterboarding and other forms of torture).
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unlawful torture.'81 Moreover, the Administration has successfully used
that debate to divert attention from the more meaningful debate that we
should be having about whether it is permissible for the United States to
be engaged in the practice of waterboarding, regardless of whether
waterboarding constitutes torture.
As a rhetorical technique, "waterboarding" focuses attention on a
relatively unimportant collateral issue in order to divert attention from a
more important substantive issue that should be under consideration.
This form of doctrinal diversion is unfortunate, because it permits a
given questionable practice to continue without ever requiring the practi-
tioner to justify that questionable practice on the merits.' 82 The Bush
Administration's practice of detaining enemy combatants in Guantd-
namo Bay provides another illustration.'83 We should be debating
whether it is permissible to detain large numbers of human beings, who
have never been convicted or even charged with a crime, under harsh
conditions, for indefinite periods of time, without according them their
customary legal rights. But, instead we are debating whether we should
use a military or judicial tribunal to resolve the many legal issues that
surround the confinement of those human beings. 184 Once again, collat-
eral issues relating to the nature of the proper tribunal have been used to
divert public attention from the fact that at least some innocent individu-
als continue to be confined for long periods of time without their con-
finement ever having been justified by the Administration that is
confining them.
Like dog-whistle politics, waterboarding also has a judicial variant.
In the Resegregation case, Chief Justice Roberts utilized judicial-
waterboarding tactics on numerous occasions to divert attention away
from the actual school resegregation he was producing, and to refocus
attention on a series of subsidiary collateral issues that were of mere
technical importance. In fact, each of the seven propositions asserted in
the Roberts litany of reasons for viewing the Louisville and Seattle inte-
gration plans as unconstitutional concerned such technical, collateral
issues. Chief Justice Roberts diverted our attention to the standard-of-
review debate; the nature of qualifying diversity; the nature of narrow
181. See id. at 99-110 (describing Bush Administration efforts to circumvent legal prohibitions
on waterboarding and other forms of torture).
182. See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1013, 1014-18, 1028-32 (2008) (describing how procedural rather than substantive issues
have dominated legal analysis of torture).
183. See id. at 1028-32 (discussing Supreme Court Guantdnamo cases).
184. See id. (discussing procedural issues in Supreme Court Guantd.namo cases); Boumediene
v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262-75 (2008) (holding that Guantdnamo detainees had constitutional
right to habeas corpus, rather than mere truncated procedures before military tribunal).
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tailoring; the relevance of racial balancing; the effect of societal discrim-
ination; the distinction between de facto and de jure discrimination; and
the relevance of colorblindness. He rarely even mentioned the fact that
the lower courts had found that invalidation of the programs at issue
would lead to the resegregation of the Louisville and Seattle schools.'
One could properly ask why those doctrinal issues are even marginally
related to the overriding issue of school resegregation that was at stake
in the case, but the answer would be disheartening. Those issues are
relevant only because the Supreme Court has chosen to make them so.
Over the last twenty years, the Court has chosen to develop equal-pro-
tection doctrine for affirmative-action cases in a way that focuses atten-
tion on those subsidiary collateral issues, rather than on the overriding
issue of whether an affirmative-action program would actually promote
or undermine equality for racial minorities. The Supreme Court has
become so skillful in utilizing the waterboarding diversion technique
that the Court has now actually built the desired diversions into the gov-
erning constitutional standards themselves. By using the technique of
judicial waterboarding, the Supreme Court has diverted our attention
away from threatening inquiries into the substantive meaning of the
Constitution and redirected our attention so that it settles harmlessly on
extraneous questions about the mere mechanics of constitutional
doctrine.
B. Judicial Plutocracy
The institution of judicial review is plutocratic in nature. Because
the meaning of most constitutional provisions is largely indeterminate,
constitutional meaning ends up consisting largely of the normative val-
ues favored by the Supreme Court justices who prescribe it. Because
those justices tend to be members of the wealthy elite that controls the
formation of governmental policy, the normative values that the justices
favor tend to be values that will advance the interests of that governing
elite. Such a process for prescribing constitutional meaning may some-
times fail to reflect the will of the democratic majority. But that failure is
not deemed fatal to the legitimacy of judicial review, because judicial
review is intended to be a countermajoritarian activity. However, the
fact that the Supreme Court possesses the raw institutional power to
interpret the Constitution in a way that advances the interests of a
plutocratic elite does not mean that it is proper for the Court to exercise
that power in a parochial or self-interested way. A properly functioning
185. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing litany of propositions invoked to support Resegregation
decision).
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Supreme Court should have higher aspirations. It should aspire to inter-
pret the Constitution with both integrity and responsibility.
1. DOCTRINAL INTEGRITY
Even if constitutional doctrine is largely indeterminate, some read-
ings of the Constitution are simply unacceptable. They are unacceptable
because they lack doctrinal integrity. In the Resegregation case, the
majority and dissenting justices offered different readings of the Consti-
tution, which led to different constitutional results. 86 In a strict doctrinal
sense, however, the reasoning in all of those opinions was equally logi-
cal. The differences between the opinions had more to do with the nor-
mative preferences of the Justices who wrote them than with any
differences in their analytical abilities. Nevertheless, the majority, plu-
rality, and concurring opinions in the Resegregation case simply seem
wrong.
Whatever Brown and the Equal Protection Clause ultimately mean,
they cannot mean that it is now okay to resegregate our schools in a way
that may be the harbinger of an even more general resegregation of our
society. Wherever Brown and the Equal Protection Clause are ultimately
trying to take us, the Resegregation decision seems to be taking us back
in the wrong direction. It seems to be transporting us back to a time in
which we will be forced to relive the pains of racial caste all over again,
and will be forced to do so for no legitimate reason. The decision's lack
of doctrinal integrity seems even more evident if a conservative-bloc
majority on the Supreme Court is actually seeking to promote racial
divisiveness in order to preserve the cohesiveness of a movement-con-
servative political coalition with which the justices in that majority hap-
pen to be in sympathy.'87
The post-modem nature of analytical reasoning is such that I cannot
prove that the Resegregation decision lacks judicial integrity. But that
does not mean that my claim is not demonstrably true. There are things
that I could say whose rhetorical impact might be sufficient to convince
you that my claim is valid. I could remind you that the Supreme Court
has a horrible history in dealing with the issue of race.' 88 Or I could
again call to your attention the political affiliations and voting records of
the conservative-bloc Justices who voted to invalidate the integration
186. See supra Part I.A. (describing opinions in Resegregation case).
187. See supra Part II (suggesting that Supreme Court is doctrinal arm of movement-
conservative political initiative).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93 (describing Supreme Court history of hostility
to racial-minority interests).
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plans at issue in the case.' 89 Or I could tell you that the famous civil-
rights empiricist Professor Gary Orfield has demonstrated how Reagan
Revolution conservatives have utilized the appointment of activist
judges to supplant the school desegregation achieved during the 1960s
and 1970s with the present resegregation that the Supreme Court has
read the Constitution to permit ever since.' 90 Or I could tell you that
Professor Reggie Oh has argued that the Resegregation decision now
constitutionalizes the infamous "Parker Doctrine," which the post-
Brown Supreme Court had to reverse because of its defiant resistance to
integration. 19' Or I could tell you that Professor Oh wonders why Chief
Justice Roberts did not choose to end his Resegregation opinion by
reminding us that "[t]he way to stop segregation on the basis of race is to
stop segregating on the basis of race," rather than choosing an aphorism
that seems intended to reinstate segregation.1 92 But I suspect that I do
not have to convince you that the Resegregation decision is wrong,
because I suspect that you already know that my claim is true. You may
not like it. You may even be actively looking for ways to resist it. But
you must, nevertheless, know that it is true. The nature of some truths is
such that they transcend mere syllogistic efforts to suppress their
validity.
2. JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
In addition to interpreting the Constitution with doctrinal integrity,
the Supreme Court should also aspire to interpret the Constitution in a
way that is judicially responsible. Even though the Court possesses vast
amounts of largely unconstrained judicial discretion, Supreme Court jus-
tices should remember that the way in which they exercise that discre-
tion can have actual effects on a wide range of social practices. I doubt
189. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33 (describing voting records of conservative-bloc
Justices in race cases).
190. See Gary Orfield, Conservative Activists and the Rush Toward Resegregation, in LAW
AND SCHOOL REFORM 39, 39-41, 45-53 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999); Gary Orfield, Turning Back to
Segregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 1, 1-5, 16-22 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996).
191. Professor Reggie Oh argues that Chief Justice Roberts is simply constitutionalizing the
infamous reading of Brown adopted by Judge Parker in the South Carolina federal district court
case of Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955), where the court relied heavily on
Brown 11 to distinguish between desegregation and integration. See Reginald C. Oh, The
Constitution Forbids Integration: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1 and the Mis-Interpretation of Brown I and II, 46 U. LouISVILLE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008). Under this so-called "Parker Doctrine," Judge Parker chose to hold
integration hostage to private choice-the very approach that the Supreme Court itself later
rejected in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See Oh, supra.
192. Oh, supra note 191. Chief Justice Roberts ended his actual opinion by proclaiming that
"[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007)
(plurality opinion); see also supra note 43 (discussing ancestry of this aphorism).
[Vol. 63:431
THE CONSCIENCE OF A COURT
that anyone still subscribes to the Marbury model of adjudication, under
which the Supreme Court exists to resolve isolated "cases" or "contro-
versies" between the parties before the Court.'9 3 Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation"' was hardly a case about whether Linda Brown could attend a
particular elementary school in Topeka, Kansas. We have now come to
expect that the Supreme Court will make broad social policy pronounce-
ments about abstract, theoretical issues such as school prayer, physician-
assisted suicide, and racial discrimination. However, the abstract nature
of the modem judicial function should not cause the Justices to lose
sight of the tangible effects that their rulings are likely to have on social
attitudes and behavior.
The Resegregation case opinions read as if they are part of an
extended philosophical debate about the desirability of colorblind race
neutrality in contemporary culture. And, in a sense, that is precisely
what they are. But, because they are also Supreme Court opinions-
rather than mere academic musings about a topical social-science
issue-they are likely to have material effects that should not be simply
ignored. As a result of the Court's decision in the Resegregation case,
public schools in much of the nation may now end up actually being
resegregated. However, the Supreme Court opinions permitting that
result are written in a tone that treats actual resegregation as only mar-
ginally relevant to the constitutional exposition being offered. In my
view, this failure to focus on the actual consequences of the Court's
decision betrays a lack of concern for the racial minorities who will be
harmed by the Court's decision, as well as for the society that is likely to
be harmed by the continuing inequalities that will ensue. Because the
Court's failure to confront the reality of resegregation cannot simply
have been an oversight, this lack of judicial concern also betrays a lack
of judicial responsibility.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court often engages in constitutional
adjudication that is judicially irresponsible in this sense. Cases like Dred
193. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 67-73 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing Marbury model of adjudication);
Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 589-92 (1983) (same).
194. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Scott, 9 5 Plessy,'9 6 and Korematsu 7 provide infamous examples of
instances in which the Supreme Court seems grossly to have underesti-
mated the actual social problems that would be produced by its irrespon-
sible decisions. I fear that the Resegregation case may turn out to be
similarly irresponsible, in a way that produces similar social problems.
The 1968 Kerner Commission concluded that a primary cause of urban
unrest during the 1960s was the toxic mixture of persistent white racism
combined with the hollow promise of civil-rights equality to racial
minorities.' 98 I fear that the Resegregation Court is heating that same
toxic mixture to a boil by exploiting racial minorities at the same time
that it purports to be promoting racial equality. Eventually, this combus-
tible combination may prove just as likely to lead to explosive results as
it did in the turbulent 1960s. But the movement-conservative Supreme
Court majority seems not to be troubled by that possibility. It seems
unable to appreciate that the oppressors cannot continue to exploit the
oppressed indefinitely without eventually generating a destabilizing
backlash. In the contemporary world climate created by ubiquitous ter-
rorist activity, that backlash may turn out to be frightening enough to
make the urban riots of the 1960s seem tepid by comparison. The mere
possibility that some such result might be produced by a Supreme Court
decision makes it seem like the height of judicial irresponsibility for the
Court simply to ignore that danger.
CONCLUSION
As I said, I have been driven to the conclusion that the Supreme
Court, as a matter of conscience, considers racial discrimination to be
good for America. I think this because the Resegregation Court went out
of its way to invalidate majoritarian efforts to promote racial equality
when there was absolutely no doctrinal reason for it to have done so.
The Resegregation case was decided along ideological lines, by a five-
justice conservative voting bloc that has never voted to uphold the claim
of a racial minority in a constitutional affirmative-action case. Moreo-
ver, the decision tortured the reasoning of Brown in an effort to make
that landmark decision stand for an inverted conception of equality that
195. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 452 (1857) (holding that blacks
could not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of
establishing diversity jurisdiction and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of
slavery as interfering with property rights of slave owners).
196. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of
separate-but-equal regime of racial discrimination in public facilities, by finding that segregation
did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause).
197. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-19 (1944) (upholding World War II
exclusion order that led to Japanese American internment).
198. See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 90-91.
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could be used to promote racial segregation rather than to eliminate it. In
so doing, I believe that the five-justice Supreme Court majority was act-
ing simply as the mouthpiece of a movement-conservative political initi-
ative. The strategy of that initiative is to convince middle-class voters to
support economic policies that harm the middle class and favor the rich,
by appealing to the racial prejudices of those middle-class voters. The
role of the Supreme Court in that endeavor has been to comfort those
middle-class voters by assuring them that their racial biases are consis-
tent with-rather than anathema to-the United States Constitution.
Obviously, Supreme Court political action of this sort does not fit
into the traditional model of judicial review. Because of its subtle invidi-
ousness, this covert politics may even transform the Supreme Court
from "the least dangerous branch" into the most dangerous branch of
government.199 Consistent with the Madisonian Republicanism founda-
tions of our constitutional form of government, the Supreme Court
should seek to equalize the democratic competition among political fac-
tions, rather than assist the wealthiest faction in its effort to dominate
other factions. 20 0 The proper role of the judiciary is to guard against
corruption of the political process by faction, but the Roberts Court has
instead simply aligned itself with the movement-conservative faction in
a way that disregards the Madisonian structural safeguards built into the
Constitution. Consistent with representation-reinforcement theories of
judicial review, the Supreme Court should intervene in the political pro-
cess to protect the interests of discrete and insular racial minorities,
rather than assist in elite white "majority" efforts to promote racial
exploitation. 20 1 The idea that the Constitution exists to protect wealth
and property interests of an aristocratic elite from the redistributive
threats posed by democratic politics is not a new one.20 2 But, I had
hoped that it was an idea whose time had both come and gone. The
Resegregation decision suggests that my hope in this regard has not
been well-founded.
I do have another hope, however, that may ultimately fare better.
My hope is that the racially regressive politics of the Supreme Court in
the Resegregation case has now become so palpable that the democratic
majority will no longer be willing to tolerate judicial nullification of its
199. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962) (elaborating on claim of
Framers that federal judiciary would be least dangerous branch of government).
200. See STONE ET AL., supra note 86, at 12-29 (discussing Madisonian Republicanism).
201. See id. at 722-24 (discussing representation-reinforcement theory).
202. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 19-63, 73-188 (Norwood Press 1948) (1913); STONE ET AL., supra note 86,
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more progressive racial policies-policies such as those that were
embodied in the Louisville and Seattle voluntary-integration plans. Only
the perception of judicial legitimacy permits the Supreme Court to sub-
stitute its policy preferences for the preferences of the democratic major-
ity. And once that perception erodes, cases such as Dred Scott2 °3 and
Lochner v. New York2" demonstrate that the Court will no longer be
able to command popular deference to its countermajoritarian policies.
Given the Supreme Court's dismal history in dealing with the issue of
race, it would be quite arrogant for the Court to think that it could do a
better job than the political branches in formulating sound racial policy.
Perhaps that arrogance will facilitate the loss of judicial legitimacy that I
think would promote racial equality. Professor Krugman has suggested
that the era of movement-conservative political domination may be com-
ing to an end. Economic hardships are causing the middle class to recon-
sider its political affiliations, and larger immigrant populations are
making the politics of racial exploitation less effective than it has been
in the past.2 °5 If that is correct, there is even more reason to hope that the
legitimacy of Supreme Court policymaking will now be called into
question. Even if the Supreme Court genuinely believes, as a matter of
conscience, that continued racial discrimination is good for America,
that is not a belief that the rest of us should find to be morally or consti-
tutionally acceptable. Nevertheless, after 232 years, the United States
remains a nation that has yet to master the art of racial equality. And that
necessarily gives one pause, even in the most hopeful of moments.
203. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 452 (1857) (holding that blacks
could not be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of
establishing diversity jurisdiction and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of
slavery as interfering with property rights of slave owners).
204. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating as constitutional-due-process violation New York
maximum-hours health-and-safety legislation for bakers).
205. See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 198-213 (discussing loss of movement-conservative
political influence).
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